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Ian Ayres’s and John Braithwaite’s book, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992) was a significant step relative to the work that preceded 
it, and simultaneously reflective and emblematic of a larger contemporaneous 
shift. The book represents a convergence between rational choice / game theory 
analysis, which was perhaps then at its apogée, and the more sociological account 
being developed by people like John Braithwaite and Peter Grabosky 
(Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). Mary Ann Glendon’s Rights Talk (1991) and 
Robert Ellickson’s Order Without Law (1991) had both come out the year before. 
David Osborne’s and Ted Gaebler’s book Reinventing Government had come out the 
month before, in February 1992 – the same month that the Maastricht Treaty, 
creating the European Union, was signed. All in 1992, Yugoslavia fell apart, 
apartheid was voted away in South Africa, the UN held the Earth Summit in 
Brazil and, in November, Bill Clinton was elected President of the United States. 
These are significant markers on the regulatory timeline because many of the 
prominent works, and the prominent contexts, that we refer to today – the Open 
Method of Coordination in the EU, the Reinventing Government efforts of Al 
Gore and Bill Clinton, significant efforts toward global environmental law and 
regulation, even the novel extrajudicial concept of the Truth and Reconciliation 
commission – had not yet occurred. This is to say nothing of the revolutions we 
have seen since. The internet was in its infancy. The multiple preconditions to the 
recent financial crisis – including widespread complex financial engineering in 
general and consumer debt securitization in particular, and the extraordinary 
growth in the over-the-counter derivatives market – were not yet in place. 
This paper seeks to take the original 1992 version of responsive regulation theory, 
as articulated by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in their book of that name, on its 
own terms. The significant insights Responsive Regulation gave us have transcended 
the book’s time at least as much as those from any other contemporary model. 
Consider the enforcement pyramid, the benign big gun, tripartism, and the way in 
which a tit-for-tat regulatory stance is supported by both game theory and civic 
republican sociological approaches. Responsive Regulation developed a principled 
way for regulators to choose between punishment and persuasion, recognizing 
that neither approach works all the time. Consider also the concepts of “multiple 
selves” and multiple registers of action; the relationship that Responsive Regulation 
describes between regulation and other forces, be they public interest groups 
(PIGs) or other actors contributing to the “license to operate” (Gunningham et. 
al. 2003); and above all the embrace of contestability and revisability. Responsive 
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Regulation’s insistence on pragmatic, context-sensitive application and continual 
evolution is an important commitment given the complexity and uncertainty that 
characterizes so many regulatory environments today.  
Responsive Regulation develops a theoretical model that is meant to apply to a broad 
range of contexts. It makes a large claim, even while recognizing that the 
significance of the theory can be assessed only “through praxis in concrete 
institutional arenas” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 99). In that spirit, our recent 
shared experience of the financial crisis may illuminate aspects of Responsive 
Regulation that might otherwise have gone unremarked. Twenty years on and with 
the benefit of this hard experience, two aspects of Responsive Regulation are striking. 
The first is the direct, personal relationship on which the regulatory interaction is 
premised. The second is the boundedness and manageability of the regulatory 
project. Regulators are understood to know what behaviors constitute compliance 
and non-compliance, to be able to interpret accurately signals from industry, and 
to be able to calibrate appropriate responses. At least in prudential regulation of 
global financial institutions in the wake of the recent financial crisis (though surely 
elsewhere too), neither the ongoing face-to-face relationship nor the boundedness 
or knowability of the regulatory terrain can be taken for granted. 
This brief essay seeks to open a preliminary conversation about Responsive 
Regulation in terms of its scalability. It considers whether as a practical matter, 
Responsive Regulation can be scaled up to more diffuse, multiparty, logistically 
complex contexts, such as financial regulation. While the theory aspires to general 
applicability, it is grounded in empirical work in a particular kind of regulatory 
environment, meaning that it may be less applicable in others. As a matter of 
representation, the essay asks whether by projecting the focal object, the 
responsive relationship, outward, Responsive Regulation distorts our image of 
regulation in other contexts. In doing so, the inquiry inevitably reflects back on 
Responsive Regulation’s own home environment, where the question is whether 
Responsive Regulation also oversimplifies the complexity and challenges inherent in 
the interpersonal relationship itself. The essay closes by arguing that in order to 
incorporate responsive regulation’s considerable discursive and relational benefits 
into regulatory environments such as global financial regulation, it needs to be 
buttressed by additional regulatory technologies.i 
 
The Roots of Responsive Regulation 
Responsive Regulation puts forward a personal, and interpersonally-based, 
perspective. Some of the book’s deepest roots, on John Braithwaite’s side, are 
with subject areas such as coal mine safety, or patient care in the nursing home 
industry. Accounts and interview excerpts derived from these environments give 
the book much of its narrative force. These are environments characterized by 
direct, face-to-face interactions between regulators and regulated actors. The fact 
that industry actors must be licensed ab initio generates an essentially finite and 
knowable pool of participants. Regulated actors are also geographically 
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embedded, in spaces such as coal mines and nursing homes, the physical 
condition of which is one of the things regulators are concerned about. The way 
to examine such institutions is to physically visit them. The context that orients 
Responsive Regulation is the personal nexus between compliance officer, supervisor, 
enforcement staffer, and management and workers. 
In addition to being personal and face-to-face, responsive regulation is 
interpersonal, meaning that the quality and nature of the human relationship 
undergirding regulation is of primary concern. The enforcement and regulatory 
pyramids are institutional features built outward from a series of human 
interactions over time, not from organization-level design concerns. The 
orientation toward the interpersonal has only increased over the last twenty years. 
The conceptual link between the responsive regulatory ideal and John 
Braithwaite’s restorative justice work (e.g., Braithwaite 1989), which is also rooted 
in personal relationships (e.g., Braithwaite 2002), is increasingly strong and 
central.  
The interpersonal orientation makes responsive regulation a rich perspective in a 
field, regulation, which tends sometimes to revolve around more theoretical or 
structural accounts. The level of so-called mundane human engagement has great 
positive and normative significance, of course. As behavioral psychologists and 
others have forcefully demonstrated in the years since Responsive Regulation was 
published, we ignore the interpersonal at our peril.ii The interpersonal orientation 
is also the source of the book’s great dynamism and context-sensitivity. From it 
flow its important insights around tailoring regulation to particular actors, 
accessing situational knowledge, and permitting flexible regulation through the 
mechanism of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 101-132). 
A focus on the interpersonal makes it possible for Responsive Regulation to envision 
a specific new form of flexible regulation, distinct from both outright deregulation 
and from the increasingly maladaptive command-and-control bureaucratic 
technique that (conventional wisdom tells us) preceded the book.iii   
This is not to say that Responsive Regulation is indifferent to more systemic 
questions. The book’s civic republican commitments are clear throughout. The 
book anticipates subsequent work on the value of incremental problem-solving as 
a mechanism for regulatory policy-making.iv Ayres and Braithwaite envision an 
incremental accretion of well-designed and participation-enhancing regulatory 
moments – such as giving real powers to relevant PIGs within tripartite discursive 
structures – ultimately to be constitutive of a republican political order that 
emphasizes direct participation in the regulatory moment, often at a very local 
level, in the service of citizen empowerment and a thicker, more engaging account 
of citizenship (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 17-18).  
In thinking about what Responsive Regulation can contribute to the financial 
regulatory arena, the question may be the degree to which one of its essential 
elements, the direct interpersonal relationship as a basis of knowledge and action, 
is scalable to the kinds of contexts that concern us in financial regulation.  
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Regulation and Scale 
What is scalability as a functional matter?  This essay uses the term scalability, 
first, in the sense that computer systems designers use it: as a technical measure of 
how well systems can handle increasing workload and data volume, either based 
on existing resources or by applying cost-effective strategies for extending the 
system’s capacity (Weinstock and Goodenough 2006). A provisional definition of 
scalability in regulation would be that it is a measure of whether and how well a 
regulatory strategy operates in environments characterized by greater levels of 
logistical complexity, workload, and scope. Of course, regulation inevitably takes 
place in a multi-scalar and trans-scalar manner, and both regulation and relevant 
scale definitions shift with time and context (see, e.g., Osofsky 2009). Scale levels 
also affect each other (Ostrom, 2009).  
All regulatory environments are characterized by complexity at the level of 
interpersonal relations – Responsive Regulation offers quite stylized depictions of 
them, even in its “home contexts” – but certain fields have other things going on 
besides. More complex, technical, or contingent regulatory contexts impose non-
trivial loads on regulatory architecture. Some regulatory fields simply have to 
engage with more, and more far-flung, regulatees than others. Some regulatees 
operate across regulatory jurisdictions, national or otherwise. Some regulatees 
produce more products, and more complex products, more quickly. Some 
products are held to more technical or complicated regulatory standards than 
others.  
This essay describes scalability through an example from international prudential 
regulation. This is by no means the only possible example of a logistically scaled-
up regulatory context. But at least in the context of international financial 
regulation, the scope, volume, and logistical complexity of the regulatory task 
(meaning, e.g., the dynamic and highly technical nature of the subject matter, the 
“long tail” and uncertain nature of consequences, difficulties in developing 
outcome indicators or assessing compliance) make things like tit-for-tat 
engagement and compliance evaluations far more challenging than responsive 
regulation imagines. Highly diffuse or decentralized environments, like some of 
the transnational network variety, also increase complexity (Abbott and Snidal 
2012). Scale is a function of a model, not the actors that implement it, though we 
could also encounter separate, serious problems of disarticulation or lack of 
coordination between actors at different scales (Abbott and Snidal 2012; Heimer 
2011). 
The concept of scalability assumes that there are different scales that are of 
concern to us.  This much seems clear, although we could define scale in terms of 
any number of metrics including the geographic, organizational, technical, or 
product-oriented.v Because the core operative mechanism in Responsive Regulation is 
the direct, interpersonal relationship between regulator and regulated entity, the 
relevant technical question is whether and how well responsive regulation 
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functions when the relationships in question move from one-to-one, to many-to-
many.vi The kind of scaling up we are concerned with is scaling up from a context 
where an inspector is engaged in a direct relationship with an inspected party, in 
relation to a bounded physical space, around a relatively straightforward set of 
regulatory compliance criteria – to contexts characterized by multiparty, 
attenuated, or disintermediated relationships, a larger and perhaps less clearly 
delineated regulatory space (in terms of scope, but also in the move from 
enforcement/compliance to prospective rulemaking), and a more logistically 
complex or contested set of regulatory compliance criteria.  
In addition to being a technical measure, scale is also a conceptual. In a classic 
article from 25 years ago, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1987) defined a 
conception of scale in law, by drawing an analogy between cartography and law. 
He claimed that “the relations law entertains with social reality are much similar 
to those between maps and spatial reality. Indeed, laws are maps …” (de Sousa 
Santos 1987, p. 282). Because maps cannot represent all features of the real world 
with perfect accuracy or they would have to be the size and shape of the real 
world, maps distort reality through three mechanisms: scale, projection, and 
symbolisation. This essay is most concerned with the first two.vii Speaking 
representationally, as de Sousa Santos does, scale is a function of size relative to 
the phenomenon to be mapped. As scale increases, that is the model tries to 
encompass a larger area, the representation of detail must decrease.viii Because 
maps are “a miniaturized version of reality, map-making involves the filtering of 
details, the selection of both meaningful details and relevant features” (de Sousa 
Santos 1987, p. 283). Whether a map is useful for a particular purpose depends on 
whether the details that have been selected are appropriate for those purposes.  
De Sousa Santos describes projection in map-making as referring to the distortions 
that have to be built in, in order to represent a round globe on a flat piece of 
paper. Cartographers can choose different ways to distort the globe. They can 
trade off overlarge poles and undersized equators, or choose to depict distance 
accurately at the expense of depicting area accurately. Which compromises are 
most acceptable will depend on the purpose to which the map is put. Crucially for 
our purposes, projection and distortion also happen outward from a focal object 
or concern. As de Sousa Santos  (1987, p. 285) says, “each map, each historical 
period or each cultural tradition of map-making has a centre, a fixed point, a 
physic or symbolic space in a privileged position around which the diversity, the 
direction, and the meaning of other spaces is organized”. Whether the distortion 
of reality that inevitably accompanies cartography does or does not entail a 
“distortion of truth”, as de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 282) puts it, is a function of the 
means by which scale, projection, and symbolisation are deployed. 
For de Sousa Santos, the hermeneutic tools of scale and projection are useful for 
understanding law. Using examples from his empirical work around 
“revolutionary legality” in Portugal, property rights in Brazil, and popular courts 
in the Cape Verde Islands, de Sousa Santos claims that particular accounts are 
only coherent at particular scales. Although different scale level accounts interact, 
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and particular social events can amount simultaneously to “legal events” at more 
than one scale level, the legal accounts created at the different levels – in terms of 
motivations, actors, central issues – are not equivalent.  
The same point can be made in financial regulation. At the small scale regulators 
could be concerned with investigating a particular financial institution for 
subprime mortgage fraud (Freiden 2004). This is the kind of factual scenario in 
which the Responsive Regulation account makes intuitive sense, even if regulators are 
not inspecting a physical plant. They are inspecting physical documents and 
speaking to those involved in creating them. Moving to a higher scale, regulators 
could be concerned with the various steps through which a defined group of 
financial institutions in a particular country transformed those subprime 
mortgages into triple-A rated securities, and marketed them. Moving to a still 
higher scale, regulators are confronted with the relationships between the 
marketing of those instruments and effects such as global systemic risk, system 
effects, interconnectedness, and the magnitude and impact of the over-the-
counter derivatives market (see, e.g., Schwarcz 2008; McCoy et. al. 2009). 
Similarly, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in summer 2010 produced, at 
different scales, lawsuits by families of those killed on the well; questions about 
safety in the oversight of deepwater drilling rigs; and extensive environmental 
effects (Broder 2011). 
Extrapolating from de Sousa Santos, we might say that some conceptual 
constructs are defined (explicitly or implicitly) in terms of a particular scale, and 
only come into focus at that scale. Examples would include ecosystem-based 
environmental law, or the tragedy of the commons – a phenomenon that can only 
affect those that have a commons in common. Certain phenomena – a the law of 
large numbers in statistics, or herd immunity in epidemiology – are so contingent 
on achieving a particular scale level that their necessary preconditions are not 
present at other (in these examples, lower) levels. James Madison was making a 
scale argument when he said that freedom from oppression required a republic of 
a certain minimum size.ix Systemic risk, system effects, and groupthink also 
depend to some degree on achieving a particular scale. Where they are present, 
they exert a considerable effect. Models embedded within other scales, which 
cannot “see” system effects, will miss an important feature of the regulatory 
landscape. 
Similarly, if the truth of an assertion depends on a scale precondition, then claims 
that seem to make sense at one level may seem incoherent at another. Lawrence 
Cunningham (2007) critiques the “rhetoric” of principles-based securities 
regulation on this basis. He argues that individual statutory provisions may be 
more rules-based or principles-based, but that the language is meaningless when 
used to describe entire regulatory regimes (but see Ford 2010, p. 265). 
Technologies and methods can also be tightly linked to a particular scale level. 
Apprenticeship-based education systems require one-on-one mentoring, while 
modern classroom education can occur in 500-seat lecture theatres. Absent some 
boosting technology, apprenticeships are not as scalable as lectures.  
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Closer to home (i.e., to Responsive Regulation), the same may apply to game 
theoretic modelling. A tit-for-tat model relies on a particularly direct and 
responsive regulator/regulated relationship. Each of two parties makes a single 
move, which is followed immediately by the other party’s responding move. This 
is a highly stylized representation of regulatory interactions in any environment – 
an important point, though beyond this paper’s scope – but the point here is that 
the consequential and signaling functions on which the model depends are even 
harder to generate when one moves from a one-to-one relationship to more 
complex, “noisier” environments. These would include one-to-many 
relationships, many-to-many relationships, or contexts where one party takes 
more than one move during its turn, and so cannot interpret exactly what 
provoked the regulatory response it receives. 
The various accounts generated through scale functions are neither operatively 
nor normatively neutral. Precisely how the legal accounts are drawn at different 
scale levels is deeply constitutive of the social event itself (de Sousa Santos 1987, 
p. 288). Moreover, like the focal concern on a map, the central legal concerns will 
ramify outward: 
“conceptualisations, interpretive styles and 
techniques as well as ideological configurations 
dominant at the centre tend to be taken out of 
their context in which they originate and exported 
to (and imposed upon) the periphery. They are 
then applied in the legal periphery with little 
attention to local regulatory needs, since such 
needs are always interpreted and satisfied from the 
point of view of the centre.” (de Sousa Santos 
1987, p. 292.) 
Scale, then, is both quantitative and qualitative. Talking about the general 
scalability of regulation is too vague to be helpful. We may be concerned simply 
about whether a system is operationally scalable at all (and it may be that some 
elements of some models are not). Yet we will also be concerned about whether 
the model scales up, while preserving attributes we particularly care about – its 
efficiency, stability, transparency, flexibility, responsiveness, or democratic 
representativeness. Taking steps to boost the scalability of a particular aspect of a 
model may negatively affect the scalability of other aspects. Assessing the “fit” of 
a particular model in relation to the regulatory problem at hand requires that we 
make normative choices and establish priorities, ex ante.  
As Elinor Ostrom has identified, different functions are best accomplished at 
different scales. In a world of finite resources, imperfect information, and self-
interested action, no single method can be ideally effective across all scales 
(Ostrom 1990). Scale-inappropriate modeling will be at best ineffective, and at 
worst deeply damaging.x If we are serious about regulatory effectiveness, there is 
value in trying to understand at what scale particular models are oriented, what 
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the implications may be for their broader effectiveness, and what we might be 
able to do about it. 
How would we describe the scale level at which the responsive regulatory account 
is principally situated? In terms of projection, what kinds and degrees of distortions 
might we confront as we move out from Responsive Regulation’s core 
preoccupations? Notwithstanding Responsive Regulation’s broader republican 
commitments, the face-to-face compliance moment is its touchstone. Following 
on John Braithwaite’s earlier book on the subject (1987), the question of when to 
punish and when to persuade is also this book’s central concern. As Ayres and 
Braithwaite recognize (1992, p. 58), their method is about enforcement and 
compliance, not prospective rule-making. To a degree that is quite unique in 
regulation studies, the circumstances are within the range of what Abram Chayes 
(1976) would have recognized as a fairly traditional conception of adjudication. 
This impresses the entire account with a particular orientation toward optimizing 
regulatory effectiveness in those moments. In de Sousa Santos’s terms, that 
moment is the focal concern of the responsive regulatory map, and its 
conceptualizations and techniques are exported to the broader context. What 
Responsive Regulation offers, then, is a roadmap for how to navigate through 
regulatory interactions in a world where the players are depicted as known or 
knowable, the subject matter is understood to be discrete, and what is called for is 
a rational decision making process that regulators can follow in determining when 
to lean in on an industry actor, and when to ease off. 
It must be said that we should consider whether even the “home environment” 
that Responsive Regulation addresses is necessarily as simple as it seems, or as simple 
as responsive regulation claims it to be. Leaving aside the behavioral psychological 
advances alluded to above, which substantially complicate our understanding of 
the interpersonal relationship, recent empirical work testing responsive regulation 
as implemented also suggests considerable gaps between theory and practice 
(Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Nielsen and Parker 2009; Welsh 2009; also Etienne 
2012). This short essay cannot engage with these challenges, which are beyond its 
scope. The point here is that, even if we assume a high degree of congruence 
between responsive regulatory theory and real life experience in the theory’s 
home environments, we cannot assume that responsive regulation will 
automatically scale upward into the highly fluid, mutable, and dynamic scale at 
which global financial regulation operates. The example below seeks to illustrate 
this point. The final section of the essay considers options that may permit the 
nature of the knowledge generated in the responsive regulatory relationship scale 
up, even if the relationships themselves do not. 
 
Basel II as a scale problem for enforced self-regulation 
Relative to the command-and-control literature that preceded it, responsive 
regulation represents an intentional move toward a more sophisticated, multi-level 
regulatory approach. Responsive regulation recognizes that a lot of information is 
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best gathered in a decentralized, firm-level manner and that knowledge about the 
particular risks associated with a particular line of business should also be drawn 
upward to the regulatory level. Though Ayres and Braithwaite do not frame it in 
these terms, one could think of the enforcement pyramid as a compliance-into-
regulation scaling tool, designed to locate discrete regulatory interactions within a 
broader conceptual matrix and to aggregate them into a comprehensive regulatory 
stance. Tripartism, also, implicitly recognizes that there are interested parties 
operating at the interstitial layer of “civil society” (as it then was called), who 
could be brought into the regulatory conversation. The book’s account of partial 
industry regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 133-157), that is, that 
government can effectively delegate regulatory tasks to a firm’s competitors by 
forcing unregulated firms to compete with regulated ones, seems like a coverage-
oriented scaling strategy, in the sense that it extends the effect of regulation 
beyond the directly regulated parties. Responsive Regulation also explicitly notes that 
both individuals and firms/corporations are capable of disaggregation into 
“multiple selves” (p. 30-35) – a vivid recognition of scale variability along a wholly 
different, actor-oriented parameter.  
Note that, consistent with Responsive Regulation’s focal concern on 
relationships, each of these ways of addressing scale is fundamentally relational in 
orientation. To the degree that Responsive Regulation even implicitly speaks about 
scale, it does so from the point of view of the interpersonal and relationship-
based priorities that animate it. Indeed, responsive regulation as described by 
Ayres and Braithwaite in 1992 is optimized in terms of efficiency, reliability, and 
regulatory credibility when operated at smaller scales. 
To illustrate, let us describe the June 2004 Basel II Capital Accord (Basel II) as 
analogous to enforced self-regulation in Responsive Regulation’s terms. I am not 
saying the financial crisis was caused by Responsive Regulation, or saying that 
Basel II was a faithful instantiation of enforced self-regulation. It was not. The 
financial crisis was multifactorial and other significant problems, such as 
regulatory gaps, played far larger roles. Nevertheless there is some value in using 
the financial crisis analogically, to help foreground the ways in which any 
regulatory approach is bound to a particular scale and ill-suited to environments 
where its focal objects are not the operative drivers. 
Responsive Regulation locates “enforced self-regulation” at the crucial intermediate 
layer of the enforcement pyramid (p. 101-132). This is an arrangement under 
which firms develop their own set of context-specific conduct rules, which are 
then publicly ratified and capable of public enforcement. The Basel II Capital 
Accords were this kind of arrangement. Basel II establishes high-level, outcome-
oriented requirements around the amount of capital that financial institutions 
need to maintain in reserve, and then devolves the process-based risk assessment 
details to the institutions themselves. The greater risk a financial institution was 
carrying, the greater its reserves had to be. In 2004, Basel II capital adequacy 
formulae were also incorporated, to disastrous effect, into the United States 
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Securities and Exchange Commission's Consolidated Supervised Entities program 
(CSE Program), concerning capital requirements for leading broker-dealers.  
Let us now consider the assumptions and core preoccupations of enforced self-
regulation. Fundamental to responsive regulatory strategies such as enforced self-
regulation is, first, the assumption that regulated actors (here, “firms”) are rational, 
autonomous and coherent enough to know how they are conducting themselves 
internally, and to behave in their own self-interest. Like other game theoretic 
models, tit-for-tat would make no sense if a regulator did not have a rational 
counterparty to deal with (Becker 1968). Second, enforced self-regulation assumes 
a meaningful regulatory presence. The regulator must be in a position to credibly 
verify firms’ conduct and to respond accordingly. It should hold in reserve a 
“benign big gun” that it can be expected to deploy, predictably and with 
justification, where circumstances warrant. For Responsive Regulation, the source 
and the context of that knowledge is the direct, highly communicative, 
interpersonal relationship between regulator and firm. Responsive Regulation 
does not require that the regulator be in the best position to know all the details 
of a firm’s business (quite the opposite), but it does require that the regulator 
actually have knowledge about the firm, including perhaps its “stance” (Black and 
Baldwin 2007). The regulator needs to be in a position to measure firms’ conduct 
against broader regulatory standards. Third, Responsive Regulation is framed 
around the notion that the regulator/firm relationship is the primary locus where 
important things happen. This is the rationale behind the tripartism prescription. 
Tripartism assumes that the main way to give voice and effect to other, civil 
society priorities is to make them part of that conversation. 
What actually took place around prudential regulation of global financial 
institutions under Basel II (and the CSE Program) was quite different, and in a 
sense can be understood as problems of scale. Finance today is global, electronic, 
fast-moving, and based on esoteric knowledge in a way that pulls it away 
significantly from regulation of physically embedded and static regulated actors. 
The first assumption above – that firms are rational, autonomous, and coherent 
enough to behave in their own self-interest – was disproved in part as a function 
of scale. Firms’ capacity to know, internally, exactly what risks they were running 
was severely limited by their heavy reliance on software to handle the 
extraordinarily complex assets, products, and markets they were dealing with 
(Schwarcz 2009). The software was flawed (Taleb 2007; Gerding 2009). Just as 
problematically, through its design the software buried contestable assumptions 
below the level of human judgment, so that even the firms themselves actually 
knew less about the kinds of risks they were running (Gerding 2009; Bamberger 
2010).  
The second assumption above, that of a credible regulatory presence, was also 
disproved in part as a function of scale. Revolving door arguments aside, the 
recent financial crisis cannot be understood primarily in terms of interpersonal 
relationships.xi In the prudential regulation environment, as a factual matter there 
was simply not a bedrock of personal relationship or personal knowledge on 
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which to build (Kingsford-Smith 2011). Among some key prudential regulators, 
such as the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, the relationship 
between firm and regulator became severely attenuated as a function of size, 
staffing, and diffuse priorities (FSA Internal Audit Division 2008; also Black 2010, 
p. 18-19). While regulators recognized the need to pursue “the same PhD rocket 
scientists the banks [were] chasing” (Hughes 2008), as a practical matter they 
lacked the regulatory capacity to credibly verify bank capital adequacy. In the 
marketing of increasingly risky products and the increasing leverage that financial 
firms themselves took on, the reliance on private sector financial modelling was 
amplified by the delegation of crucial decision-making, by regulators, to those-
that-modeled. Regulatory self-accounts relied increasingly on the fiction of the 
self-disciplining efficient market (UK Financial Services Authority 2009). This was 
a scale problem in the sense that the scale of banks’ resources and the scale of the 
problem outmatched regulators’ resources. (Power and influence are more than 
just scale problems, of course: Ford 2011).  
There was also a structural scale problem that contributed: in the United States, 
where the worst problems occurred, the Basel II structure was incorporated into 
the CSE Program on a voluntary basis because no American regulator had the 
authority to impose capital adequacy requirements on global shadow banks (SEC 
2008, p. 81).xii Regulatory arbitrage between London and New York also played a 
role (Turner Review 2009). These are problems of scale mismatch between the 
national mandate of the regulator and the global scale of the issue. The result, in 
responsive regulatory terms, was that there was no credible public regulatory 
presence at all, and no benign big gun in the background.  
Finally, the third assumption above – that the regulator/firm relationship was the 
primary locus where important things happened – was also disproved in part as a 
function of scale. Far more important in the run-up to the financial crisis were 
fully unregulated nearby spaces, such as the over-the-counter derivatives market 
and the players in it; and the industry-wide competitive effects that produced a 
behavioral cascade toward excessive risk-taking. Focusing on the regulator/firm 
relationship misapprehends the economic and collective scale at which problems 
were building. 
To the extent that Responsive Regulation is organized around the three assumptions 
above, and especially on the presence of an interpersonal regulator-firm 
relationship as a basis for knowledge, it is incapable of speaking to the 
circumstances surrounding Basel II. Because interpersonal and knowledge-
generating relationships are at the centre of the enforced self-regulation 
conceptual map, it would be a costly mistake – a distortion of truth, in de Sousa 
Santos’s terms (1987, p. 282) – to apply the model upward through scales without 
reflecting on whether it still adequately represented the most salient facts, and 
whether it was still congruent with regulatory concerns and priorities that came 
into view at a different scale. Making enforced self-regulation relevant and 
meaningful at a wholly different scale requires that we find ways to scale the 
model up, past the reach of interpersonal relationships.xiii Moreover, we will want 
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to do so without losing whatever it is that we think is most essential about 
responsive regulation itself. While distortions and trade-offs will be inevitable as 
we move through scales, we can make choices about what we most care about 
accurately projecting upward.  
 
Where do we go from here? Responses 
The precise kinds of relationships on which Responsive Regulation is founded 
probably cannot be scaled upward without incurring excessive costs. They would 
be if we committed to a direct supervisory relationship all the way up, through 
national and even global financial regulation (e.g., Pan 2011), though such linear 
scalability would be very costly. Another option would be a form of corporatist or 
“club” government, in which important regulatory decisions were made in forums 
where regulatory and industry elites interacted with each other, with only an 
attenuated relationship to those they notionally represented. Financial institutions’ 
and governments’ mutual economic dependence already makes this a reality at the 
global level (Gelpern 2011). This preserves the direct relationship, but at the cost 
of transparency, incorporating local information, and representativeness and 
accountability (to say nothing of Responsive Regulation’s more aspirational civic 
republican aims). Instead, I would take a normative stance in favor of trying to 
project upward the nature and source of information that responsive regulation 
generates – incremental, contextual, experiential, and collaboratively generated. 
There are two main options in trying to make responsive regulation function at 
higher scales. The first is to reduce the demands imposed on the responsive 
regulatory system, by limiting the scale, scope, or logistical complexity of the 
environment in some way. Computer systems designers know that systems are 
more scalable if they do less for each user. What, then, is the minimum that the 
(responsive) regulatory system must do (in order to still be responsive)? Risk-
based approaches, which try to allocate regulatory resources to the most high risk 
contexts, may be helpful in this regard (e.g., Black 2005; but see Gunningham 
2011, p. 9). We may also want to consider the selective use of prophylactic or 
default rules (e.g., Dorf and Sabel 1998), for the purpose of containing complexity 
and limiting explicit variability.xiv  Bright line capital adequacy requirements are 
such a tool, and form part of the new Basel III Accord in the forms of leverage 
ratios, mandatory capital conservation buffers, and similar measures (Basel III). 
Routinization and standardization can also be scaling mechanisms, because by 
holding some elements stable they create a platform on which diverse approaches 
can interact (Simon 2011). Ironically, it was in fact a standardized contract for 
purchase and sale, the ISDA Master Agreement, which permitted the over-the-
counter derivatives market to grow to the extent and in the diversity that it did 
(Jomadar 2007). Where and how risk assessments, standardization, and 
prophylactic rules are embedded is a value-laden choice. Additionally, as Annelise 
Riles has observed in describing the “agency” of tools, forms and technique are 
contested and highly consequential (2011, p. 229). Yet carefully applied, these 
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techniques may play an important role in corralling the regulatory project within 
manageable bounds. 
The second option would be to try to boost responsive regulation’s capacity at 
higher scales. We have fewer real-life examples to look to here, though scholars 
have contributed proposals. For example, creating a centralized standard-setting 
and information-processing clearinghouse to aggregate information and 
coordinate more localized regulatory engagements could help transform small-
scale, discrete regulatory moments into something more systemic (e.g., Dorf and 
Sabel 1998, p. 287–89, 354–56). Institutionalized “learning loops” and the meta-
regulatory notion of “regulating self-regulation” are another possibility (Parker 
2002). Automated information gathering and computerized analytical models are 
surely part of this endeavor. Recognizing that the risks associated with 
automation can be considerable (Gerding 2009; Bamberger 2010), scalability to 
extremely complex environments would otherwise be beyond human capacity. 
Consciously establishing or trying to tweak existing governance nodes is another 
possibility, though we should be clear that there is nothing automatically 
democratic or fair about nodal governance (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing 2005). 
In trying to scale responsive regulation upward, we cannot assume that either its 
dynamism or its representativeness will automatically flow upward. Elinor 
Ostrom’s work is instructive here. She and her colleagues argue that workable 
regulation must reflect the boundaries of the relevant epistemic communities, and 
the problem in question. Efforts at scaling should pay attention to those 
boundaries, and should ensure that local-level information is valued and that 
agency relationships have some legitimacy (McGinnis and Ostrom 2008). Ayres’s 
and Braithwaite’s role for PIGs in tripartism reflects the same intuitions, but 
Responsive Regulation does not address exactly how PIGs will be constituted, and it 
does not contemplate a public role in ensuring that all relevant voices are at the 
table. What Ostrom (1990) envisions is much more intentionality in the design of 
nested regulatory enterprises across scales for such functions as information-
gathering, policy-making, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance. 
The trade-offs involved in scaling up Responsive Regulation are not unmitigated 
tragedies. As de Sousa Santos points out, representations can actually be made 
more useful if one includes and omits the right things as scale increases and detail 
is lost (1987, p. 283-84). The techniques above could make the difference between 
an effective regulatory process that builds on incremental engagements, and a 
series of disjointed and non-aggregating enforcement interactions that 
cumulatively do not a system make. The task is to identify the tools that can help 
convert diffuse, face-to-face responsive regulatory interactions into something 
both effective at a higher scale, and also reflective of Responsive Regulation’s own 
normative commitments in favor of civic engagement. 
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i I am grateful to Carol Heimer for this phrasing. 
ii Although not the focus of this essay, this is another significant way in which our understanding of 
regulation has evolved. When Responsive Regulation was published, Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky were still a full decade away from being awarded the Nobel Prize. Much behavioral psychology 
research engages at the same interpersonal level that Responsive Regulation does, and it represents an 
especially direct challenge to the book’s more rational-actor based elements, including to some degree tit-
for-tat enforcement and the regulatory pyramid. In a different vein, we also have greater insight now into 
the degree to which organizational hierarchies and legal architectural features influence the 
interpersonal/relational level at which Responsive Regulation is pitched. 
iii An interesting recent empirical study of law scholars’ increasing, and increasingly pejorative, use of the 
term “command-and-control” is in Short (2012). 
iv See, e.g., Sparrow (2000); also the experimentalists, notably Dorf and Sabel (1998). 
v De Sousa Santos (1987, p. 287) restricts his depiction of scale in law to three scale levels described 
geographically: local law, nation state law, and world legality. In other contexts, these three levels may 
seem more arbitrary than helpful. Another aspect of scale – the temporal dimension – is beyond this 
paper’s scope. See, e.g., McGinnis and Ostrom (2008).  
vi Scale as I am using it should be distinguished from the economic concept of “economies of scale”. My 
question is not whether Responsive Regulation can enjoy increasing returns with scale (something I 
would seriously doubt) but rather whether the things we value about Responsive Regulation can be 
carried up through scale levels where the interpersonal relationship no longer pertains. On the distinction 
between economies of scale and scalability, see Chuang (2001). 
vii Symbolisation, which de Sousa Santos (1987, p. 285) describes as “the representation of selected 
features and details of reality in graphic symbols”, is less central to this discussion. The particular 
metaphors in Responsive Regulation – the enforcement pyramid, the benign big gun, the tit-for-tat 
relationship – are symbolisation. 
viii Cartographers, and de Sousa Santos, use scale terms in the opposite way to how computer systems 
designers and some other academics use them. Cartography uses the term “large scale” to refer to more 
local, high-detail maps that cover a smaller area, and “small scale” for more high-level, less detailed 
maps. By contrast, computer systems designers and others speak of “scaling up” from “small scale” 
environments to more complex or larger ones. See, e.g., note 20 in McGinnis & Ostrom, 2008. Although 
the cartographic definition is more technically correct, I am using the computer science definition. It 
comports better with colloquial understandings of the terms and better illustrates the concepts examined 
here. 
ix See, e.g., Federalist No. 10 (Madison 2003, p. 78); also Federalist No. 55 (Madison 2003, p. 339). 
x See, e.g., Scott (1999). 
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xi This is not to dismiss those arguments; only to say that the primary mechanisms here were not directly 
interpersonal in the way that, for example, bribery or improper influence would be. The mechanism was 
not operating at the same level that Responsive Regulation would have been operating. It operated at the 
institutional level. 
xii See also Ostrom (1990) on the need for congruence in terms of scale between regulatory mandate and 
regulatory capacity. 
xiii John Braithwaite himself disagrees that this level of interpersonal distance is inevitable. He advocates 
instead for more hands-on regulation, which would allow regulators to “kick the tyres” on financial 
products. Braithwaite (2009). 
xiv I am not saying that rules are invariably more certain or predictable than more flexible processes. 
Rigid rules may just force variability and discretion “underground”. Nevertheless there is still some 
potential benefit in limiting the number of moving pieces with which a regulator must explicitly contend.  
